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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal
(In)Complete Contract
by
ANDREAS ROIDER∗
This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts.
In a holdup framework, we provide two sets of conditions under which simple del-
egation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem. In cases
where overinvestment can be ruled out, delegation is optimal if the payoffs of the
parties satisfy certain separability conditions. If overinvestment might be an issue,
delegation (possibly with restricted competencies) is optimal if additionally some
continuity requirements are met. The paper also contributes to the literature on
delegation, where such replication results have previously been derived in settings
with asymmetric information. (JEL: D 82, D 23, L 14, L 22)
1 Introduction
Motivation. Contracts are often less complex than one might expect. It has long been
recognized that in many instances contracts are vague or silent on a number of key
features. Frequently, parties to a business transaction just allocate ownership or deci-
sions rights between each other and do not resort to more detailed contracts (see, e.g.,
MACAULAY [1963]). In an attempt to explain these observations, the literature on
the foundations of incomplete contracts has unearthed conditions under which such
apparent contractual incompleteness arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. That
is, it has been shown that, even if decisions are contractible and message games
are feasible, simple contractual forms might be optimal. In particular, the complete
lack of an ex ante contract (see, e.g., CHE AND HAUSCH [1999], HART AND MOORE
[1999], SEGAL [1999]), noncontingent contracts specifying fixed decisions and
payments (see, e.g., EDLIN AND REICHELSTEIN [1996], SEGAL AND WHINSTON
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[2002]), or simple option contracts (see, e.g., NÖLDEKE AND SCHMIDT [1995],
[1998], EDLIN AND HERMALIN [2000], SCHWEIZER [2000]) might turn out to be
solutions to a complete-contracting problem. Somewhat surprisingly, another in-
stitutional arrangement that is frequently observed in practice, namely simple del-
egation of authority, has only received limited attention in the literature on the
foundations of incomplete contracts. The present paper represents a step in filling
this gap.
Framework. In line with most of the literature on the foundations of incomplete
contracts, we study a complete-contracting version of a holdup model. There are
two symmetrically informed, risk-neutral parties who want to conduct a joint project.
Ex ante one of the parties may make an observable, but nonverifiable investment to
raise the value of an asset (the investor’s human capital, a machine, etc.), which the
parties use in the course of their project. We consider a setting where both parties
directly profit from an increase in asset value. For example, A’s investment might
raise the value of a physical asset (a machine, a brand name, a customer list, etc.)
from which both parties may profit. Likewise, a human-capital investment by an
agent will frequently increase both the payoff of the principal and the agent’s outside
opportunities.1 Ex post, after uncertainty over the state of the world has been lifted,
some decisions (for example, regarding the use of the asset) have to be taken. As in
the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts, we assume that the ex post
decisions, transfer payments, and messages sent between the parties are verifiable
by a court. Hence, these variables can be part of an initial contract. As the parties
are symmetrically informed, they will always renegotiate the initial contract to an
ex post efficient outcome after the ex post state of the world has been realized.
Consequently, the purpose of the initial contract is to influence the threatpoint
payoffs of the parties in a way that provides optimal investment incentives.
Intuition and Results. Below we derive conditions on the basics of the model (i.e., the
payoff functions of the parties) under which an optimal contract amounts to nothing
more than granting the investing party authority over the decisions and specifying
a fixed transfer payment (e.g., a fixed wage). Our results are robust in the sense that
they do not depend on the distribution of bargaining power between the parties and
hold independently of the probability distribution of the random state of the world.
Given that potentially more sophisticated message-dependent contracts are feasible,
why might simple delegation of authority be optimal? First, note that applying
results of MASKIN AND MOORE [1999] allows one to derive an upper bound for the
1 Hence, in the terminology of CHE AND HAUSCH [1999], the investment will have
both selfish and cooperative effects. Such hybrid investments have previously been
considered by, e.g., BERNHEIM AND WHINSTON [1998], CHE AND HAUSCH [1999],
SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002], and ROIDER [2004]. If the investment affects the
threatpoint payoff of only one of the parties, then, given some technical assumptions,
a noncontingent contract specifying fixed decisions and payments will be optimal (see,
e.g., SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002]).
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investment return under any contract. Second, suppose the investing party (i.e., the
agent) is granted authority. Intuitively, if the agent has authority, ex post, he prefers
decisions that maximize his total payoff. From an ex ante perspective, however, these
decisions might fail to maximize the agent’s marginal return from investing – thereby
possibly leading to a lower net surplus than what the parties could possibly attain
under some alternative contract. Below, however, we provide a simple sufficient
condition on the payoff functions of the parties under which this issue does not
arise. In this case, the agent’s ex ante and ex post incentives with respect to the
choice of decision are aligned, and delegation of authority to the agent attains the
above-described upper bound on investment incentives. In particular, independent
of the distribution of bargaining power between the parties and independent of the
probability distribution of the random state of the world, this is the case if the
decision-dependent parts of the threatpoint payoffs of the parties are proportional to
the asset value (and if decisions have no additional investment-independent effects).
Hence, in settings where it is optimal to maximize the agent’s investment incentives,
delegation of authority to the agent is optimal if the above condition is met.
In cases where potential overinvestment is an issue, we show that delegation of
authority remains optimal if additionally some continuity requirements are met.
However, in order to avoid overinvestment, it might be necessary to tailor compe-
tencies (in the sense that it might be necessary to contractually restrict discretion
to a subset of possible decisions). Intuitively, specifying a choice set that rules out
some actions dampens the agent’s investment incentives, and by tailoring the agent’s
competencies in the right way it is possible to achieve the first best.
Contribution and Relation to the Literature. The paper is related to two strands
of the literature. First, the paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of
incomplete contracts. The basic structure of our model is the same as in SEGAL
AND WHINSTON [2002].2 They show that if it does not depend on the realization
of the ex post state of the world which of the parties profits most from an invest-
ment, the parties can optimally restrict themselves to noncontingent contracts (i.e.,
contracts where the specified decisions and payments do not depend on messages
sent by the parties). For example, SEGAL AND WHINSTON’s [2002] result applies if
investments have either purely selfish or purely cooperative effects (see, e.g., EDLIN
AND REICHELSTEIN [1996] and CHE AND HAUSCH [1999], respectively). However,
if both parties directly benefit from investments, SEGAL AND WHINSTON’s [2002]
result will frequently fail to hold. Consequently, our main focus is on such settings
2 In slightly different holdup models HART AND MOORE [1999] and SEGAL [1999]
show that the complete absence of an ex ante contract might be optimal. In contrast
to CHE AND HAUSCH [1999], they provide such results for the case of purely self-
ish investments. They consider settings where the parties want to trade one unit of
a widget out of a large number of ex ante possible widgets. Only one special widget
(where it is ex ante unknown which of the widgets is special) creates a surplus ex post.
It is shown that if the complexity of the environment (i.e., the number of ex ante pos-
sible widgets) goes to infinity, the lack of a contract is optimal. For alternative expla-
nations of the complete absence of a contract, see, e.g., TIROLE [1999].
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(i.e., settings where optimal contracts are necessarily message-dependent), and we
describe circumstances under which the optimal message-dependent contract takes
the particularly simple form of delegation of authority to one of the parties.
Previous work on the optimality of simple forms of contingent contracts has
mainly focused on option contracts, i.e., contracts where the specified decisions
and payments are functions of messages of only one of the parties (see, e.g.,
SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002]).3 However, as both decisions and payments are
message-dependent, such option contracts might still take a rather complicated
form. In a framework similar to SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002], SCHWEIZER [2000]
shows that if only one of the parties invests, simpler dichotomous option contracts
(where one of the parties can select between just two decision–payment pairs) may
be optimal if for any decision the net expected postrenegotiation payoff of the in-
vesting party is a strictly single-peaked function of the investment. However, in
general it will depend on the probability distribution of the random state and on
the distribution of bargaining power whether this condition is satisfied. Dichoto-
mous option contracts may also be optimal if parties invest sequentially (see, e.g.,
NÖLDEKE AND SCHMIDT [1995], [1998], EDLIN AND HERMALIN [2000]). Finally,
there exist complete-contracting justifications of AGHION AND TIROLE’s [1997]
delegation model. However, their model differs from the present paper on a number
of dimensions (e.g., they consider a moral-hazard problem of information acquisi-
tion). TIROLE [1999] shows that in AGHION AND TIROLE’s [1997] setup some form
of delegation might be optimal even if the ex post information structure is verifiable.
In an earlier discussion-paper version of their paper, AGHION AND TIROLE [1997]
show that, as long as the payoff consequences of decisions are ex ante unknown to
both parties and as long as the agent is unresponsive to monetary incentives, forms
of delegation may be optimal even if decisions are contractible ex ante.
Note that, throughout the paper, we focus on delegation of formal authority, which
AGHION AND TIROLE [1997] define as the legal right to take certain decisions.
In their model a party without formal authority has, however, real authority if
its recommendations are rubber-stamped. In holdup models the allocation of real
authority is not an issue because the parties will always renegotiate to an ex post
efficient outcome. Hence, we do not study second-best decision-making by a party
with real authority, but explore whether the allocation of formal authority might
generate optimal investment incentives from an ex ante perspective.
Second, the paper is related to the literature on delegation. This literature has
mainly followed one of two approaches. As the revelation principle implies that,
given some assumptions, centralized control cannot be dominated by any delegation
arrangement (see, e.g., MYERSON [1982]),4 a first strand of the delegation litera-
3 In this sense, delegation is a simple form of an option contract, and noncontin-
gent contracts are a special case of delegation with restricted competencies. As a con-
sequence, whenever noncontingent contracts are optimal, some form of delegation will
be optimal as well.
4 Under centralized control the principal, based on agents’ messages, selects deci-
sions and payments from a contractually specified menu.
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ture has assumed that there are imperfections in the contracting environment that
render the revelation principle invalid. For example, it has been shown that if there
are limits to communication or commitment, if it is costly to process information,
or if agents might collude, delegation of authority may be strictly optimal (for an
overview, see, e.g., POITEVIN [2000], MOOKHERJEE [2003]).5 The present paper
differs from this strand of the delegation literature by abstracting from such imper-
fections. Thereby, it follows the same approach as the second strand of the delegation
literature that has aimed to derive replication results (i.e., conditions under which
simple delegation of authority performs just as well as the best message-dependent
contract). Replication results have previously been derived in adverse-selection
models (see, e.g., MELUMAD, MOOKHERJEE, AND REICHELSTEIN [1992], [1995],
MCAFEE AND MCMILLAN [1995], MOOKHERJEE AND REICHELSTEIN [1997],
[2001], BALIGA AND SJÖSTRÖM [2001]) and multiagent moral-hazard problems
(see, e.g., BALIGA AND SJÖSTRÖM [1998]). The present paper contributes to this
strand of the delegation literature by providing a replication result in a symmetric-
information holdup model. To summarize: first, as in the literature on the foundations
of incomplete contracts, we consider a complete-contracting version of a holdup
problem. We contribute to this literature by providing conditions under which sim-
ple delegation of authority is optimal. Second, we contribute to the literature on
delegation by obtaining a replication result in a model framework that has not been
considered in this literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model
is introduced. In section 3 we present conditions for the optimality of delegation.
There, we employ two illustrative examples related to the question of market entry to
convey the intuition behind our results. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to an appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Description of the Model
Basic Structure. We consider a standard holdup model with two risk-neutral, sym-
metrically informed parties, P and A, who want to conduct a joint project. The
principal P has to rely on the agent A, who may make a preparatory investment
i ∈ [0, ı ] that increases the value of an asset. For example, A may invest in his human
capital to perform better in later tasks. Alternatively, A might possess some special
skills that allow him to raise the value of a physical asset. After the investment has
been made, the project is carried out. That is, some decisions d = (d1, ..., dn) ∈ D
have to be taken, where D = D1 × · · · × Dn ⊂ n and n ≥ 1. While the investment
5 See also the recent literature on partial contracting, which allows for message-
dependent mechanisms but assumes that only control over decisions (i.e., who
has the right to take them), not the decisions themselves, is contractible (see, e.g.,
AGHION, DEWATRIPONT, AND REY [2002]).
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has to be made by A, we assume that both P and A are, in principle, able to take the
decisions. Suppose that initially the principal P holds the decision rights. Figure 1
depicts the sequence of events.
Figure 1
The Sequence of Events
At date 1, the parties sign a contract C . Initial contracts are discussed in more
detail below. At date 2, A invests i ∈ [0, ı ] at costs c(i). At date 3, uncertainty  ∈ E
over the ex post state of the world (i, ) is resolved, where E denotes the set of
possible random states. A’s investment increases the value a(i, ) of the asset. We
assume that c and a are continuously differentiable in i, and a ≥ 0, ai > 0, aii < 0,
ci > 0, cii ≥ 0, where, throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives. As the ex
post state of the world is now known to both parties, at date 4 P and A simultaneously
send messages θ P and θ A , respectively, about the ex post state of the world, where
θ P, θ A ∈ Θ ≡ [0, ı ] × E . Finally, before decisions are taken and payments are made
at date 6, the parties may renegotiate the contract C at date 5.
Information and Contracts. In line with the literature on the foundations of incom-
plete contracts, we assume that (i) all variables are observable to the parties, (ii)
initial contracts cannot directly condition on the ex post state of the world (i, ),
and (iii) the decisions d, transfer payments between the parties, and messages sent
at date 4 are verifiable by a court (and hence can be part of an initial contract).6
MASKIN AND MOORE [1999] have shown that in the present holdup setting with
renegotiation the revelation principle allows one to restrict attention to direct revela-
tion mechanisms (i) that specify the decisions and an ex post transfer payment from
P to A as functions of the messages of the parties about the ex post state of the world,
and (ii) under which truthful reporting of the ex post state by both parties is a Nash
equilibrium on and off the equilibrium path.7 Formally, a contract C is defined as
a mapping [d̂ , t̂ P, t̂ A] : Θ×Θ→ D ×  × , where t̂ P(θ P, θ A) + t̂ A(θ P, θ A) = 0
for all θ P and θ A.
6 It would be straightforward to extend the model to the case that some of the deci-
sions are not contractible ex ante.
7 Note that given our assumptions, there will exist ex ante transfer payments that
ensure participation by both parties. As such ex ante payments have no effect on in-
vestment incentives, they are not considered explicitly.
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Payoffs. By sending messages θ P and θ A at date 4, the parties select decisions
d̂ (θ P, θ A) and payments t̂ j(θ P, θ A) for j = P, A from the contractually specified
menu. For the moment, we neglect the arguments of the functions d̂ and t̂ j for
ease of notation. If renegotiation of the contract at date 5 would fail, the parties
would realize their threatpoint payoffs at date 6. The threatpoint payoffs of P and A
depend on the initial contractC . They are given by π j(d̂ ,a(i, ), )+ t̂ j for j = P, A,
where π j is assumed to be continuously differentiable in i for j = P, A. Hence, as
discussed above, the threatpoint payoffs of both parties may depend on the value
of the asset. As the parties are symmetrically informed, they will, however, always
succeed in renegotiating the initial contract and take ex post efficient decisions at
date 6. Thereby, they create an ex post surplus given by
φ(i, ) ≡ max
d∈D
{∑
j
π j(d, a(i, ), )
}
,(1)
where we assume that φ(i, ) is nonnegative and continuously differentiable in i,
φi > 0, and φii < 0. Again in line with the literature, we assume that P and A
share the resulting renegotiation surplus in Nash bargaining with exogenously given
bargaining powers β j , where 0 < β j < 1 for j = P, A. Hence, the postrenegotiation
payoffs of P and A consist of their respective threatpoint payoffs and shares of the
renegotiation surplus. They are given by
Π j(d̂ , t̂ j, i, ) ≡ [ π j + t̂ j ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
threatpoint payoff
+ β j · [φ − π P − π A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
renegotiation surplus
(2)
for j = P, A, where the arguments of the functions π j , t̂ j , and φ have been dropped
for ease of notation.
Optimal Contracts. As ex post efficiency is achieved through renegotiation, the
purpose of the initial contract C is to generate investment incentives. The ini-
tial contract affects A’s investment incentives because it influences the threatpoint
payoffs of the parties and hence the distribution of the ex post surplus. As the
parties are symmetrically informed, ex ante they sign a contract that maximizes
the net expected surplus of their relationship. Define θ ≡ (i, ), Π̂ j(θ P, θ A, θ) ≡
Π j(d̂ (θ P, θ A), t̂ j(θ P, θ A), i, ), and Π j(θ) ≡ Π̂ j(θ, θ, θ) for j = P, A. Formally, an
optimal contract C ∗ solves the following problem:
max
[d̂ (·),̂t P (·),̂t A(·)]
{ E [φ (i, )] − c(i)} ,(3)
subject to the truth-telling constraints
Π
P
(θ) ≥ Π̂P (θ P, θ, θ) ∀ θ, θ P(4)
and
Π
A
(θ) ≥ Π̂A (θ, θ A, θ) ∀ θ, θ A(5)
of P and A, respectively, and subject to the constraint
i ∈ arg max
î
{ E[ΠA( î, )] − c( î )}.(6)
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Denote the investment that obtains under an optimal contract by i(C ∗).
First Best. Ex ante efficiency (i.e., the first-best outcome) is achieved if the optimal
contract induces an investment i∗ that maximizes the ex ante expected net surplus
of the relationship. Formally,
i∗ = arg max
i
{ E[φ(i, )] − c(i)},(7)
where we assume i∗ > 0.
2.2 Illustrative Examples
In the following, we introduce two illustrative examples in order to provide an
intuition for our findings. Consider a problem of project choice in the spirit of
AGHION AND TIROLE [1997]. Suppose there are n possible projects that P and A
might pursue. After the agent has invested and the ex post state of the world has
been realized, a decision has to be made which (if any) of the n projects should be
conducted (i.e., d = (d1, ..., dn) ∈ {0, 1}n). We simplify this setting of project choice
in that we assume that (i) there is only one potential project (i.e., n = 1), (ii) the asset
value is identical to the investment (i.e., a(i, ) ≡ i for all ), and (iii) the parties
have identical bargaining power (i.e., β j = 0.5 for j = P, A). While this structure
lends itself to various interpretations, both of the following examples are concerned
with the question of market entry.
EXAMPLE 1 Suppose a principal has hired an agent to develop a new service or
product, where P’s valuation of the product is given by i. Ex post a decision has to
be made about whether the parties should or should not enter the market with the
newly developed product. If no market entry occurs (i.e., if d = 0), the threatpoint
payoffs of both parties are zero. If, however, entry occurs (i.e., if d = 1), P sells the
product on the market. Thereby, P derives a threatpoint payoff of i. Market entry
also affects the agent A. Suppose that A cares about the market’s (possibly noisy)
perception of him being a good innovator, where we assume that A’s reputation is
proportional to the value of the product and given by (1 + ) · i, where  ∈ [−1, 1].
The second example looks at decision-making in a joint venture.
EXAMPLE 2 Suppose that P and A are partners in a joint venture, where the parties
contemplate market entry with a product developed by A. As above, the threatpoint
payoffs of P and A are zero if there is no market entry. If, however, the parties
enter the market, then each partner sells the product through its own outlets, and
we let i denote the profit per unit sold by either of the partners. Suppose that P
and A face stochastic market demands p() and α(), respectively, where p, α > 0.
For example, suppose that random fractions of consumers arrive at either partner’s
outlets.
What kind of contracts should the parties sign in the above examples? Might it
suffice to sign a noncontingent contract specifying that the parties enter the market
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no matter what? Why might such contracts fail to be optimal? If this is the case, does
simple delegation of authority lead to the desired outcome, or are more elaborate
contracts necessary? These questions are the focus of the next section.
3 Delegation of Authority
In this section we present conditions for the optimality of delegation that do not
depend on the distribution of bargaining power between the parties and that do not
depend on the probability distribution of the random state of the world.
DEFINITION 1 We speak of delegation of authority to the agent if the initial contract
specifies some fixed payment t̂ A ∈  and prescribes that party A is free to choose
any d̂ ∈ D.
DEFINITION 2 Under delegation of authority, we speak of restricted competencies
if party A is free to choose any d̂ ∈ D∗, where D∗ ⊂ D.
Given our assumption that decisions are contractible, the above-described transfer
of authority to the agent through an explicit delegation contract is always feas-
ible. Alternatively, it might also be possible to transfer authority to the agent by
letting him acquire ownership of some (nonhuman) assets. For example, suppose
there is a machine (initially owned by P), and all decisions in D relate to how this
machine should be used. If, in the initial contract, the parties just agree to trans-
fer ownership of this asset to the agent in exchange for some fixed payment, this
will lead to the same outcome as delegation of authority: following the definition
in the property-rights theory of the firm (see, e.g., GROSSMAN AND HART [1986],
HART AND MOORE [1990], HART [1995]), ownership of an asset confers residual
rights of control over the asset on the owner, i.e., if not bound contractually, he has
authority to decide on the asset’s uses.8
There might, however, be two problems with such a transfer of authority through
asset ownership. First, the project that P and A aim to conduct might not neces-
sarily require a physical (i.e., nonhuman) asset.9 For example, consider the case
that P and A aim to provide a service, and the only asset on which they rely is
their respective human capital. As, in this case, there is no asset of which owner-
ship could be transferred, the above-discussed allocation of decision rights through
a transfer of ownership is not feasible. Second, more generally, even if physical
assets are involved, ownership of these assets (e.g., the machines) might not im-
ply authority over all decisions relevant for the project. Importantly, note that, in
8 In this respect, our results also contribute to the literature on the foundations of
the property-rights theory of the firm (see, e.g., CHE AND HAUSCH [1999], MASKIN
AND TIROLE [1999], ROIDER [2004]). This literature provides conditions under which
the restriction of attention to allocations of ownership rights as made in the property-
rights theory is justified even when quantity (trade) contracts are feasible.
9 For a more detailed discussion of such settings, see, e.g., RAJAN AND ZINGALES
[1998].
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accordance with the holdup literature, we assume that the payoffs of the parties
are not verifiable (and consequently not contractible). Hence, in contrast to the
principal–agent literature, where “selling the shop” is generally meant to imply
a transfer of all payoff rights to the agent (thereby making him residual claimant),
such a transfer of payoff rights is not possible here. Instead, in the property-rights
theory, a firm is defined as a collection of nonhuman assets. Hence, even if A
“buys the firm,” he only acquires residual rights of control over the relevant as-
sets, and does not necessarily acquire control over all decisions relevant to the
project.10
Formally, suppose there is a set of (nonhuman) assets S ≡ {S1, ..., Sm}, where
m ≥ 1, of which ownership can in principle be transferred. If there exists a subset
SD ⊆ S such that ownership of SD (i.e., residual rights of control over the assets
in SD) implies authority over all decisions in D, then the outcome under delega-
tion of authority (as defined above) can be replicated through a transfer of asset
ownership.
In order to identify conditions under which delegation of authority performs just
as well as the best message-dependent contract, we will proceed in two steps. First,
note that, as the parties will always renegotiate to an ex post efficient outcome
at date 5, at date 4 when sending their messages P and A play a constant-sum
game (where the constant sum is given by φ(i, )). This observation, in combi-
nation with the truth-telling constraints (4) and (5), allows us to derive an upper
bound for A’s marginal investment return under any arbitrary contract (see, e.g.,
MASKIN AND MOORE [1999]). Second, we identify a condition on the payoff func-
tions of the parties that ensures that simple delegation of authority to A attains this
upper bound. Hence, in settings where maximum investment incentives are desir-
able, delegation of authority is optimal if Condition 1 below holds. This case is
discussed in section 3.1. If overinvestment cannot be ruled out from the outset, we
show that delegation (possibly in combination with carefully restricted competen-
cies) is optimal if additionally some continuity requirements are met. This case is
discussed in section 3.2.
3.1 Underinvestment Case
For the moment, suppose that even under the optimal contract the equilibrium
investment level i(C ∗) falls short of the first-best investment level i∗ (i.e., i(C ∗) ≤ i∗).
At the end of this subsection, we provide simple conditions under which this will
indeed hold true. In such underinvestment settings, delegation of authority to A is
optimal if and only if it leads to an investment level weakly above the equilibrium
investment under any other feasible contract.
Under which circumstances will this be the case? To illustrate the underlying
intuition consider Example 1. For the moment we restrict attention to message-
10 For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between the principal–agent
and property-rights theories, see, e.g., HART [1995]; for a critical assessment of the
property-rights theory, see, e.g., HOLMSTROM AND ROBERTS [1998].
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independent decisions and payments. In Example 1, market entry is always ex post
efficient (because i(2 + ) ≥ 0 for all i and ), and hence the ex post surplus is given
by φ (i, ) = i(2 + ). Consequently, it follows from (2) that the postrenegotiation
payoff of A is given by
ΠA(d̂ , t̂ A, i, ) =
{
i(1 + 0.5) + t̂ A if d̂ = 0,
i(1 + ) + t̂ A if d̂ = 1.(8)
If the initial contract is silent with respect to market entry, the parties will agree on
market entry ex post, and A appropriates half of the ex post surplus through such
renegotiation. If the initial contract already prescribes (ex post efficient) market
entry, there will be no renegotiation, and A just obtains his threatpoint payoff. For
all i and  define
d˜ A(i, ) ∈ arg max
d̂ ∈D
{ ΠAi (d̂ , t̂ A, i, ) }.(9)
It follows from (8) that we have d˜ A(i, ) = 0 if  < 0, and d˜ A(i, ) = 1 if  ≥ 0. That
is, it depends on the realization of the random state of the world which contractually
specified decisions maximize the agent’s investment incentives. Only in ex post
states where the agent’s investment has a sufficiently strong effect on his reputation
(i.e., where  ≥ 0) does contractually prescribed market entry lead to maximal
investment returns. In states where the agent’s reputation is relatively unresponsive
to his investment (i.e., where  < 0), the agent would derive higher investment returns
if the initial contract specified that the question of market entry is only decided in
ex post negotiation (i.e., d̂ = 0). Note that even if (incentive-maximizing) decisions
d˜ A(i, ) were taken in every ex post state, the agent’s private investment return would
fall short of the social investment return φi (i, ) because 2 +  > max{1 + ,1 + 0.5}
for all . As a consequence, the parties face an underinvestment problem, and it will
be optimal to maximize A’s investment incentives.11
Now, does there exist a contract that leads to decisions d˜ A(i, )? In particular,
might delegation of authority to the agent achieve this? Suppose that A indeed has
authority. In this case, A makes decisions that maximize his total postrenegotiation
payoff:
d̂ A(i, ) ∈ arg max
d̂ ∈D
ΠA(d̂ , t̂ A, i, ).(10)
It immediately follows from (8), (9), and (10) that in Example 1 we have d̂ A(i, ) =
d˜ A(i, ) for all i and .12 Hence, in the context of Example 1, delegation of authority
to the agent will be optimal (see Proposition 1 below). A completely analogous
11 This observation immediately implies that in the present example noncontin-
gent contracts, which specify fixed decisions and payments, lead to less than maxi-
mal investment incentives, and hence a noncontingent contract will not be optimal.
More generally, Example 1 shows that if both parties profit from an investment and
if the parties are relatively symmetric, SEGAL AND WHINSTON’s [2002] condition for
the optimality of noncontingent contracts is likely to be violated. This is illustrated in
more detail in Appendix A.1.
12 We assume that decisions d˜ A(i, ) and d̂ A(i, ) exist in every ex post state (i, ).
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argument applies in Example 2. That is, despite the fact that in both of the above
examples complicated contracts are feasible, a simple contractual arrangement is
optimal: it suffices to grant party A authority to decide over market entry and to
agree on a fixed transfer payment. Intuitively, as the threatpoint payoffs of the parties
are proportional to the asset value, the postrenegotiation payoffs of the parties are
proportional to the asset value as well. This implies that in every ex post state ΠA
and ΠAi are maximized by the same decisions d̂ .
If the following condition is met, this basic intuition extends to more general
settings (e.g., settings where multidimensional decisions have to be taken or where
the asset value is stochastic).
CONDITION 1 The decision-dependent parts of the threatpoint payoffs of the par-
ties are linear in the asset value, and the decisions have no investment-independent
effect. Formally, the threatpoint payoffs can be expressed as
π j(d̂ , a(i, ), ) ≡ ρ j(d̂ , ) · a(i, ) + γ j(a(i, ), ),
where γ j is continuously differentiable in i for j = P, A.
In general, it depends not only on the shape of the functions π P and π A, but also
possibly on the distribution of bargaining power between the parties, whether the
agent’s ex post and ex ante incentives with respect to the choice of decision are
aligned (to see this, reconsider the postrenegotiation payoff function (2) of the
agent). As a consequence, it might depend on the distribution of bargaining power
between the parties whether delegation is optimal. However, if Condition 1 is met,
this issue does not arise.13 That is, Condition 1 constitutes an easily interpretable
sufficient condition for the optimality of delegation that does not require knowledge
of the bargaining power of the parties.14
PROPOSITION 1 (UNDERINVESTMENT CASE) If Condition 1 holds and the parties
face an underinvestment problem, delegation of authority to A is optimal.
It now remains to discuss under which circumstances the parties indeed face an
underinvestment problem. Define
i D ∈ arg max
i
{E[ΠA(d˜ A(i, ), t̂ A, i, )] − c(i)},(11)
for t̂ A ∈ . Clearly, if Condition 1 is satisfied, delegation is optimal as long as i D ≤ i∗
holds. While, in general, it depends on the probability distribution of  whether this
is the case, Lemma 1 below identifies properties of P’s payoff function such that an
underinvestment problem arises independent of the probability distribution of .
13 For the two-sided investment case, EDLIN AND REICHELSTEIN [1996] derive
a separability condition on the payoff functions of the parties under which they can
optimally restrict themselves to noncontingent contracts. Their Condition A3 allows
for investment-independent effects of decisions, but in contrast to our Condition 1
above, they only consider purely selfish investments. As a consequence, neither of the
two conditions is a special case of the other.
14 In Appendix A.3 we extend Proposition 1 below to the case of a multidimen-
sional investment by the agent.
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LEMMA 1 (UNDERINVESTMENT) If Condition 1 holds and ρP, γ Pi ≥ 0, the parties
face an underinvestment problem.
Intuitively, if the investment has a direct positive effect on both parties, the agent’s
investment incentives are reduced (see, e.g., CHE AND HAUSCH [1999]). On the one
hand, A’s investment raises his own threatpoint payoff. This has a positive effect
on A’s investment incentives. On the other hand, however, P’s threatpoint payoff
goes up too. This harms investment incentives because the available renegotiation
surplus is reduced. As a consequence, private investment returns fall short of social
investment returns, and the first best cannot be attained.
3.2 Overinvestment Case
In this subsection, we turn to the case that overinvestment cannot be ruled out from
the outset (i.e., by knowledge of the payoff functions of the parties). For example,
suppose that in some ex post states A’s preferred decisions are unfavorable for P in
the sense that they cause P’s threatpoint payoff to be negative (i.e.,ρP (d̂ A(i, ), ) < 0
for some (i, )). In this case, A’s investment would affect P’s threatpoint payoff
negatively, thereby possibly providing A with private investment returns above
social investment returns.15 If such ex post states are sufficiently likely, allowing
the agent to take any decision might lead to overinvestment. However, even when
overinvestment cannot be ruled out from the outset, it is possible to state conditions
for the optimality of delegation that do not depend on the probability distribution
of . In particular, delegation of authority turns out to be optimal if Condition 1 and
some additional (arguably mild) requirements are met, but it might be necessary to
contractually restrict the agent’s competencies.
CONDITION 2 (i) Decisions are continuous (i.e., D ≡ [0, d 1] × · · · × [0, d n]).
(ii) Decisions have continuous effects (i.e., ρ j(d̂ , ) is continuous in d̂ for j = P, A).
(iii) Null decisions exist (i.e., ρ j((0, ..., 0), ) = 0 for all  and j = P, A).
Part (iii) of Condition 2 states that if no decisions are taken (i.e., if the status quo
is maintained), the decision-dependent parts of the threatpoint payoffs are zero.
Intuitively, if overinvestment might occur, it is possible to reduce A’s investment
incentives by specifying in the initial contract that ex post the agent may select only
from some set D∗ of decisions, where D∗ ⊂ D. In this case, incentive-maximizing
decisions d˜ A(i, ) might not be feasible, which would result in lower returns from
investing. Hence, by carefully choosing D∗ it might be possible to provide A with
first-best investment incentives. Conditions 1 and 2 jointly ensure that this is the
case.
To illustrate this, suppose that allowing A to choose from D would lead to
overinvestment. First, Conditions 1 and 2 imply that there exists some truncated
15 That is, there would be a rent-seeking motive for investment (see, e.g.,
RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998]).
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choice set D∗ ⊆ D such that (given that A is allowed to choose any d̂ ∈ D∗ ex post),
i∗ satisfies the first-order condition of A’s ex ante maximization problem.
Second, note that given that the asset value affects the threatpoint payoffs of
both parties, for given decisions the postrenegotiation payoff of A might very well
fail to be concave in his investment. This holds true even if a, π P , π A , and φ
are well behaved. To see this note that (2) implies that for fixed decisions and
payments the marginal investment return of A in a given ex post state is given by
βPπ Ai + βAφi − βAπ Pi . Hence, even if π A, π P , and φ are strictly concave in i, the
investment return is not necessarily concave. However, if the agent has authority, his
postrenegotiation payoff turns out to be concave in the investment if null decisions
exist and γ j(a(i, ), ) ≡ γ˜ j() ∀  holds for j = P, A: intuitively, the existence of
null decisions ensures that in every ex post state A can secure himself a nonnegative
investment return, which in combination with Condition 1 implies concavity.
PROPOSITION 2 (OVERINVESTMENT CASE) If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, and
γ j(a(i, ), ) ≡ γ˜ j() for all  and j = P, A, delegation of authority to A is op-
timal, but it might be necessary to restrict competencies.
In the proof of Proposition 2 we show that one simple way to optimally restrict
competencies is to rule out extreme choices.16 That is, we show that a choice
set of the form D∗ = [0, d 1 − ω1] × · · · × [0, d n − ωn] for some ω1, ..., ωn ≥ 0 is
optimal.
Note that in the present overinvestment case it will in general not be possible
to replicate the necessary fine tuning of decision rights through the rather coarse
instrument of a transfer of asset ownership, where ownership of each individual
asset might imply a whole set of decision rights.
4 Conclusion
The present paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, the litera-
ture on the foundations of incomplete contracts has identified circumstances under
which simple contractual arrangements (such as noncontingent contracts, options,
or the complete lack of an initial contract) are solutions to a complete-contracting
problem; thereby helping to explain why contracts frequently appear to be in-
complete. We add to this literature by providing conditions under which simple
delegation of authority is optimal even though complete contracts are feasible.
Moreover, as an alternative to delegation, it may be possible to transfer authority
16 While in the present model restricting competencies serves to reduce invest-
ment incentives, SZALAY [2005] discusses a principal–agent model where restricting
the agent to “extreme” decisions (i.e., decisions that may turn out to be either very
beneficial or very detrimental) may foster the agent’s incentives to acquire decision-
relevant information. Partial forms of delegation may also emerge if a principal can
only commit to a decision rule, but not to monetary transfers (e.g., HOLMSTROM
[1984], MELUMAD AND SHIBANO [1991], ARMSTRONG [1994]).
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to the agent through a transfer of ownership rights. Hence, the paper also con-
tributes to the literature on the foundations of the property-rights theory of the
firm. Second, the literature on delegation has shown that in settings of asymmetric
information delegation might perform just as well as the best message-dependent
mechanism. The present paper contributes to this strand of the delegation litera-
ture by providing such a replication result in a symmetric-information holdup
model.
Our conditions for the optimality of delegation are robust in the sense that they
do not depend on the distribution of bargaining power between the parties or on
the probability distribution of the random state of the world. First, if the parties
face an underinvestment problem and Condition 1 holds, unrestricted delegation of
authority to A is optimal because it maximizes A’s incentives to invest. Second,
if overinvestment might occur, delegation is nevertheless optimal if, in addition
to Condition 1, decisions are continuous and have a continuous effect, and null
decisions exist. In the latter case it might be optimal to restrict competencies by
allowing A to choose from only a subset of the feasible decisions. To summarize,
our results suggest that in settings (joint ventures, employment relationships, etc.)
where increases in asset value (e.g., the value of a physical asset or the value of
the agent’s human capital) have proportional effects on the parties, some form of
delegation of authority is optimal, and there is no need for the parties to resort to
more complicated contracts.
So far we have considered a setting where one of the parties invests. If both
parties invest simultaneously, SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002] have shown that non-
contingent contracts may be optimal if the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs
of the parties only depend on a one-dimensional aggregate of investments.17 In
a similar spirit, it is straightforward to extend our results to the case that both
parties invest, but that the payoffs of the parties only depend on the total amount
invested. For example, HART [1995] has argued that in the case of investments
in physical capital it will frequently not matter which of the parties actually in-
vests. Similarly, in marketing joint ventures or horizontal production joint ven-
tures, partners will often provide homogeneous inputs (such as money or some
intermediate product) such that only the total amount invested matters.18 Intui-
tively, in the case of transferable investments only one of the parties will in-
vest in equilibrium (if some technical assumptions are met). As a consequence,
the above results continue to hold, but it will depend on the parameters of the
model whether authority should be delegated to party A or party P. If invest-
17 Without imposing aggregation assumptions, EDLIN AND REICHELSTEIN [1996]
and CHE AND HAUSCH [1999] prove such results for the case that both investments are
purely selfish (i.e., only the respective investor benefits directly) and for the case that
both investments are highly cooperative in every ex post state, respectively.
18 LAFFONT AND TIROLE [1993, p. 88] have argued that, due to “creative account-
ing” opportunities, even homogeneous inputs might be hard to verify. For example, if
monetary contributions are used to buy certain inputs or services, the investor might
collude with the provider of the input in order to overstate its price.
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ments cannot be aggregated in this way, optimal contracts have in general to pro-
vide investment incentives for both parties. It awaits future research to determine
under which conditions some form of delegation of authority is optimal in such
cases.
Appendix
A.1 Noncontingent Contracts
In the following, we briefly discuss SEGAL AND WHINSTON’s [2002] result on the
optimality of noncontingent contracts (see their Proposition 4). Consider a setting
where D = [0, d ], and π Ai , π Aid , π Pi , π Pid > 0. In this case, it follows from equa-
tion (2) that the marginal effect of a change in d̂ on A’s investment return is given
by
ΠAid( · ) = βAπ Aid( · ) − βPπ Pid( · ).(A1)
We say that the investment has a mainly selfish effect in ex post state (i, ) if
ΠAid(i, ) ≥ 0, and that it has a mainly cooperative effect otherwise. Given some
assumptions, SEGAL AND WHINSTON [2002] show that noncontingent contracts are
optimal if it does not depend on the realization of uncertainty  whether the invest-
ment has a mainly selfish or mainly cooperative effect on the investing party (see
their Condition H±). This condition is, for example, satisfied if the investment is
purely selfish, i.e., if π Ai > π Pi ≡ 0 (see EDLIN AND REICHELSTEIN [1996]), or if
the investment is purely cooperative, i.e., if π Pi > π Ai ≡ 0 (see CHE AND HAUSCH
[1999]). It follows from (A1) that, in general (i.e., if investments have both selfish
and cooperative effects), it depends on the distribution of bargaining power be-
tween the parties and on the shape of the functions π A and π P whether SEGAL AND
WHINSTON’s [2002] condition is met. In particular, if the parties are sufficiently
symmetric (e.g., if βP = βA = 0.5 and π A(·) ≈ π P(·)), it is likely that this is not the
case, and noncontingent contracts are in general not optimal.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Note that when the parties send their messages at date 4, they play a constant-sum
game, i.e.,
Π̂P
(
θ P, θ A, θ
)+ Π̂A (θ P, θ A, θ) = φ(θ) for all θ P, θ A, θ ∈ Θ.(A2)
Combining (A2) and P’s truth-telling constraint (4) implies
(A3) φ(θ) −ΠA (θ) = ΠP (θ) ≥ Π̂P (θ ′, θ, θ) = φ(θ) − Π̂A (θ ′, θ, θ)
for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ,
and hence
Π
A
(θ) ≤ Π̂A (θ ′, θ, θ) for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ.(A4)
Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract(2006) 407
Combining A’s truth-telling constraint (5) and (A4) yields
Π̂A
(
θ, θ ′, θ
) ≤ ΠA (θ) ≤ Π̂A (θ ′, θ, θ) for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ,(A5)
and by analogy
Π̂A
(
θ ′, θ, θ ′
) ≤ ΠA (θ ′) ≤ Π̂A (θ, θ ′, θ ′) for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ.(A6)
Finally, combining the second inequality in (A5) and the first inequality in (A6)
implies
Π
A
(θ) −ΠA (θ ′) ≤ Π̂A (θ ′, θ, θ)− Π̂A (θ ′, θ, θ ′)(A7)
for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ (see, e.g., MASKIN AND MOORE [1999]). Hence, for any θ = (i, )
and θ ′ = (i ′, ), where i ′ > i, the inequality (A7) allows us to derive an upper bound
to A’s investment return:19
∂Π
A
(θ)
∂i
≡ lim sup
i′→i
Π
A
(θ) −ΠA (θ ′)
i − i ′
≤ βAφi(i, )
+ lim sup
i′→i
{
βPπ Ai (d̂ (θ ′, θ), a(i, ), ) − βAπ Pi (d̂ (θ ′, θ), a(i, ), )
}
= βAφi(i, ) +
[
βPγ Ai (a(i, ), ) − βAγ Pi (a(i, ), )
](A8)
+ lim sup
i′→i
{
ai(i, ) · [βPρA(d̂ (θ ′, θ), ) − βAρP(d̂ (θ ′, θ), )]
}
,
≤ βAφi(i, ) +
[
βPγ Ai (a(i, ), ) − βAγ Pi (a(i, ), )
]
+ ai(i, ) · [βPρA(d̂ A(i, ), ) − βAρP(d̂ A(i, ), )],
where the second inequality follows from (10) and Condition 1. Note that Condi-
tion 1 implies that, while the incentive-maximizing decisions d̂ A(i, ) may depend
on the random state , they do not vary with the level of A’s investment. In this
respect, Condition 1 is a polar case to SEGAL AND WHINSTON’s [2002] Condi-
tion H±, which requires that, for a given i, the incentive-maximizing decisions be
independent of the random state . As the parties face an underinvestment problem,
it is optimal to maximize A’s investment incentives. Given the above inequality, this
is achieved by specifying in the ex ante contract that A receives some fixed payment
t̂ A ∈  and that he is free to choose any d̂ ∈ D ex post.
A.3 Extension: A Multidimensional Investment
Frequently, an agent will engage in various preparatory activities. If investment
components are strategic complements, Proposition 1 can be extended to the case
of a multidimensional investment. Under slight abuse of notation, suppose that A
chooses a k-dimensional investment vector i ≡ (ι1, ..., ιk), k ≥ 1, from a compact
subset of k. For simplicity, assume that investment costs are linear, i.e., c(i) =
ι1 + · · · + ιk. Now, suppose that authority over ex post decisions is delegated to A
19 For a similar approach, see, e.g., CHE AND HAUSCH [1999].
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and that he receives a fixed payment t̂ A ∈ . In this case, define ιl(ι−l) as the lth
investment component that A chooses ex ante for a given ι−l . Formally,
ιl(ι−l) ∈ arg max
ιl
{ΠA(d̂ A(i, ), t̂ A, i, ) − ιl}(A9)
for l = 1, ..., n. If Condition 1 holds, null decisions exist, and γ j(a(i, ), ) ≡ γ˜ j()
for all i,  and j = P, A, then ιl(ι−l) and the equilibrium investment vector i˜ are
unique. If, in addition, the investment components are strategic complements, then
delegation is optimal because, for each investment component, it is optimal to
maximize A’s incentives. Figure A1 serves to illustrate Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3 Suppose A makes a multidimensional investment and the parties
face an underinvestment problem. If Conditions 1, 2(iii), γ j(a(i, ), ) ≡ γ˜ j() ∀ i, ,
and aιl ιm , φιl ιm > 0 hold for all l = m and j = P, A, delegation of authority to A is
optimal.
PROOF Condition 2(iii) implies that βP · ρA(d̂ A(i, ), ) − βA · ρP(d̂ A(i, ), ) ≥ 0
∀ i, . Hence, for all l, ιl(ι−l) is unique and nondecreasing in ι−l . Moreover, given
delegation, the equilibrium investment vector i˜ = (˜ι l, ι˜−l) is unique (where i˜ is
implicitly defined by ιl (˜ ι−l) = ι˜ l for all l). Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1,
it follows from Condition 1 that under any arbitrary contract C it holds that
∂Π
A
(θ)
∂ιl
≤ βA · φιl (i, ) + aιl (i, ) · [βP · ρA(d̂ A(i, ), )
− βA · ρP(d̂ A(i, ), )] ∀ i, .
(A10)
Hence, for a given ι−l , the lth investment component chosen when authority is
delegated to A is weakly larger than the ιl chosen under any other contract C . Define
Figure A1
Delegation and a Multidimensional Investment:
An Example Where i ≡ (ι1, ι2)
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Ω ≡ {i | ιl ≤ ιl(ι−l) for all l}. The above inequality together with the fact that the
functions ιl are nondecreasing in their arguments implies that (a) any investment
equilibrium î(C ) under an arbitrary contract C is in the set Ω (i.e., î(C ) ∈ Ω ∀C ),
and (b) î l(C ) ≤ ι˜l ≤ ι∗l ∀C , l. Hence, delegation of authority to A, which leads to i˜,
is optimal. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
A’s investment falls short of the efficient investment level if
∂ΠA(d̂ A(i, ), t̂ A, i, )
∂i
≤ ∂φ(i, )
∂i
(A11)
for all i and . For all (i, ) define
d∗(i, ) ∈ arg max
d∈D
{π P(d, a(i, ), ) + π A(d, a(i, ), )},(A12)
where we assume that d∗(i, ) exists for all (i, ). Condition 1 implies that, for a given
, d̂ A(i, ) and d∗(i, ) do not vary in i. Note that γ Pi (a(i, ), ) ≥ 0 for all i and .
This discussion in combination with (A11) implies that a sufficient condition for
underinvestment is given by
βP · {[ρA(d̂ A(i, ), ) + ρP(d̂ A(i, ), )] − [ρA(d∗(i, ), ) + ρP(d∗(i, ), )]}
(A13)
≤ ρP(d̂ A(i, ), )
for all i and . The definition of d∗(i, ) implies that the left-hand side of (A13) is
nonpositive. Hence, (A13) is satisfied for all (i, ), because ρP(d̂ , ) ≥ 0 by assump-
tion. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
If i D < i∗ (see (11)), Proposition 1 implies that unrestricted delegation of authority
(i.e., D∗ = D) is optimal. Next, consider the case i D ≥ i∗. Define a truncated decision
space D(ω) ≡ [0,d 1 − ω1] × · · · × [0,d n − ωn], where ωl ∈ [0,d l] ∀ l ∈ {1, ...,n}. In
analogy to (10), define
ρ˜A(, ω) ≡ max
d̂ ∈D(ω)
{βPρA(d̂ , ) − βAρP(d̂ , )}.(A14)
Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that solutions to (A14) exist for all  and ω. Condition 2
implies ρ˜A(,ω) ≥ 0 ∀,ω. This observation together with the concavity of E[φ(i, )]
implies E[βA · φii(i, )+ aii(i, ) · ρ˜A(,ω)] < 0 ∀ i,ω. Hence, it follows from i D ≥ i∗
that E[ai(i∗, ) · ρ˜A(,ω0)] ≥ E[βP · φi(i∗, )] > 0, where ω0 ≡ (0, ...,0). Now, define
ω ≡ (d 1, ..., d n). Condition 2 implies ρ˜A(, ω) = 0, and hence E[ai(i∗, ) · ρ˜A(, ω)]
= 0. Moreover, as ρA and ρP are continuous in d̂ , it follows from Berge’s theorem of
the maximum that the value function ρ˜A is continuous in ω. Hence, the intermediate-
value theorem implies that there exists an ω∗ such that E[βAφi(i∗, ) + ai(i∗, ) ·
ρ˜A(, ω∗)] = E[φi(i∗, )]. Consequently, if party A is free to choose from the set
D(ω∗) ex post, he finds it optimal to invest i = i∗ ex ante. Q.E.D.
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